[upstream commit 41c48f3a98231738c5ce79f6f2aa6e40ba924d18]
There are multiple use-cases when it's convenient to have access to bpf
map fields, both `struct bpf_map` and map type specific struct-s such as
`struct bpf_array`, `struct bpf_htab`, etc.
For example while working with sock arrays it can be necessary to
calculate the key based on map->max_entries (some_hash % max_entries).
Currently this is solved by communicating max_entries via "out-of-band"
channel, e.g. via additional map with known key to get info about target
map. That works, but is not very convenient and error-prone while
working with many maps.
In other cases necessary data is dynamic (i.e. unknown at loading time)
and it's impossible to get it at all. For example while working with a
hash table it can be convenient to know how much capacity is already
used (bpf_htab.count.counter for BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC case).
At the same time kernel knows this info and can provide it to bpf
program.
Fill this gap by adding support to access bpf map fields from bpf
program for both `struct bpf_map` and map type specific fields.
Support is implemented via btf_struct_access() so that a user can define
their own `struct bpf_map` or map type specific struct in their program
with only necessary fields and preserve_access_index attribute, cast a
map to this struct and use a field.
For example:
struct bpf_map {
__u32 max_entries;
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
__u32 elem_size;
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
__uint(max_entries, 4);
__type(key, __u32);
__type(value, __u32);
} m_array SEC(".maps");
SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
int cg_skb(void *ctx)
{
struct bpf_array *array = (struct bpf_array *)&m_array;
struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *)&m_array;
/* .. use map->max_entries or array->map.max_entries .. */
}
Similarly to other btf_struct_access() use-cases (e.g. struct tcp_sock
in net/ipv4/bpf_tcp_ca.c) the patch allows access to any fields of
corresponding struct. Only reading from map fields is supported.
For btf_struct_access() to work there should be a way to know btf id of
a struct that corresponds to a map type. To get btf id there should be a
way to get a stringified name of map-specific struct, such as
"bpf_array", "bpf_htab", etc for a map type. Two new fields are added to
`struct bpf_map_ops` to handle it:
* .map_btf_name keeps a btf name of a struct returned by map_alloc();
* .map_btf_id is used to cache btf id of that struct.
To make btf ids calculation cheaper they're calculated once while
preparing btf_vmlinux and cached same way as it's done for btf_id field
of `struct bpf_func_proto`
While calculating btf ids, struct names are NOT checked for collision.
Collisions will be checked as a part of the work to prepare btf ids used
in verifier in compile time that should land soon. The only known
collision for `struct bpf_htab` (kernel/bpf/hashtab.c vs
net/core/sock_map.c) was fixed earlier.
Both new fields .map_btf_name and .map_btf_id must be set for a map type
for the feature to work. If neither is set for a map type, verifier will
return ENOTSUPP on a try to access map_ptr of corresponding type. If
just one of them set, it's verifier misconfiguration.
Only `struct bpf_array` for BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY and `struct bpf_htab` for
BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH are supported by this patch. Other map types will be
supported separately.
The feature is available only for CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y and gated by
perfmon_capable() so that unpriv programs won't have access to bpf map
fields.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6479686a0cd1e9067993df57b4c3eef0e276fec9.1592600985.git.rdna@fb.com
[upstream commit fa28dcb82a38f8e3993b0fae9106b1a80b59e4f0]
Introduce helper bpf_get_task_stack(), which dumps stack trace of given
task. This is different to bpf_get_stack(), which gets stack track of
current task. One potential use case of bpf_get_task_stack() is to call
it from bpf_iter__task and dump all /proc/<pid>/stack to a seq_file.
bpf_get_task_stack() uses stack_trace_save_tsk() instead of
get_perf_callchain() for kernel stack. The benefit of this choice is that
stack_trace_save_tsk() doesn't require changes in arch/. The downside of
using stack_trace_save_tsk() is that stack_trace_save_tsk() dumps the
stack trace to unsigned long array. For 32-bit systems, we need to
translate it to u64 array.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200630062846.664389-3-songliubraving@fb.com
[upstream commit d141b8bc5773cbbaf5b8530f08f94fc10fff9e8c]
Sanitize and expose get/put_callchain_entry(). This would be used by bpf
stack map.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200630062846.664389-2-songliubraving@fb.com
[upstream commit 0d4fad3e57df2bf61e8ffc8d12a34b1caf9b8835]
The helper is used in tracing programs to cast a socket
pointer to a udp6_sock pointer.
The return value could be NULL if the casting is illegal.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200623230815.3988481-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 478cfbdf5f13dfe09cfd0b1cbac821f5e27f6108]
Three more helpers are added to cast a sock_common pointer to
an tcp_sock, tcp_timewait_sock or a tcp_request_sock for
tracing programs.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200623230811.3988277-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit af7ec13833619e17f03aa73a785a2f871da6d66b]
The helper is used in tracing programs to cast a socket
pointer to a tcp6_sock pointer.
The return value could be NULL if the casting is illegal.
A new helper return type RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL is added
so the verifier is able to deduce proper return types for the helper.
Different from the previous BTF_ID based helpers,
the bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock() argument can be several possible
btf_ids. More specifically, all possible socket data structures
with sock_common appearing in the first in the memory layout.
This patch only added socket types related to tcp and udp.
All possible argument btf_id and return value btf_id
for helper bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock() are pre-calculcated and
cached. In the future, it is even possible to precompute
these btf_id's at kernel build time.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200623230809.3988195-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366]
Implement permissions as stated in uapi/linux/capability.h
In order to do that the verifier allow_ptr_leaks flag is split
into four flags and they are set as:
env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
The first three currently equivalent to perfmon_capable(), since leaking kernel
pointers and reading kernel memory via side channel attacks is roughly
equivalent to reading kernel memory with cap_perfmon.
'bpf_capable' enables bounded loops, precision tracking, bpf to bpf calls and
other verifier features. 'allow_ptr_leaks' enable ptr leaks, ptr conversions,
subtraction of pointers. 'bypass_spec_v1' disables speculative analysis in the
verifier, run time mitigations in bpf array, and enables indirect variable
access in bpf programs. 'bypass_spec_v4' disables emission of sanitation code
by the verifier.
That means that the networking BPF program loaded with CAP_BPF + CAP_NET_ADMIN
will have speculative checks done by the verifier and other spectre mitigation
applied. Such networking BPF program will not be able to leak kernel pointers
and will not be able to access arbitrary kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
[upstream commit a17b53c4a4b55ec322c132b6670743612229ee9c]
Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.
CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.
Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.
CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.
CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.
Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
[upstream commit 3c32cc1bceba8a1755dc35cd97516f6c67856844]
Commit b121b341e598 ("bpf: Add PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL
support") adds a field btf_id_or_null_non0_off to
bpf_prog->aux structure to indicate that the
first ctx argument is PTR_TO_BTF_ID reg_type and
all others are PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL.
This approach does not really scale if we have
other different reg types in the future, e.g.,
a pointer to a buffer.
This patch enables bpf_iter targets registering ctx argument
reg types which may be different from the default one.
For example, for pointers to structures, the default reg_type
is PTR_TO_BTF_ID for tracing program. The target can register
a particular pointer type as PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL which can
be used by the verifier to enforce accesses.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513180221.2949882-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit ab2ee4fcb9d61fd57db70db694adbcf54662bd80]
Change func bpf_iter_unreg_target() parameter from target
name to target reg_info, similar to bpf_iter_reg_target().
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513180220.2949737-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 15172a46fa2796c1a1358a36babd31274716ed41]
Currently bpf_iter_reg_target takes parameters from target
and allocates memory to save them. This is really not
necessary, esp. in the future we may grow information
passed from targets to bpf_iter manager.
The patch refactors the code so target reg_info
becomes static and bpf_iter manager can just take
a reference to it.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513180219.2949605-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 21aef70eade22a656297c28d5da93301915d2ac2]
This is to be consistent with tracing and lsm programs
which have prefix "bpf_trace_" and "bpf_lsm_" respectively.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513180216.2949387-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit d46edd671a147032e22cfeb271a5734703093649]
Currently, sysctl kernel.bpf_stats_enabled controls BPF runtime stats.
Typical userspace tools use kernel.bpf_stats_enabled as follows:
1. Enable kernel.bpf_stats_enabled;
2. Check program run_time_ns;
3. Sleep for the monitoring period;
4. Check program run_time_ns again, calculate the difference;
5. Disable kernel.bpf_stats_enabled.
The problem with this approach is that only one userspace tool can toggle
this sysctl. If multiple tools toggle the sysctl at the same time, the
measurement may be inaccurate.
To fix this problem while keep backward compatibility, introduce a new
bpf command BPF_ENABLE_STATS. On success, this command enables stats and
returns a valid fd. BPF_ENABLE_STATS takes argument "type". Currently,
only one type, BPF_STATS_RUN_TIME, is supported. We can extend the
command to support other types of stats in the future.
With BPF_ENABLE_STATS, user space tool would have the following flow:
1. Get a fd with BPF_ENABLE_STATS, and make sure it is valid;
2. Check program run_time_ns;
3. Sleep for the monitoring period;
4. Check program run_time_ns again, calculate the difference;
5. Close the fd.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200430071506.1408910-2-songliubraving@fb.com
[upstream commit b121b341e5983bdccf7a5d6cf9236a45c965a31f]
Add bpf_reg_type PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL support.
For tracing/iter program, the bpf program context
definition, e.g., for previous bpf_map target, looks like
struct bpf_iter__bpf_map {
struct bpf_iter_meta *meta;
struct bpf_map *map;
};
The kernel guarantees that meta is not NULL, but
map pointer maybe NULL. The NULL map indicates that all
objects have been traversed, so bpf program can take
proper action, e.g., do final aggregation and/or send
final report to user space.
Add btf_id_or_null_non0_off to prog->aux structure, to
indicate that if the context access offset is not 0,
set to PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL instead of PTR_TO_BTF_ID.
This bit is set for tracing/iter program.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175912.2476576-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 138d0be35b141e09f6b267c6ae4094318d4e4491]
This patch added netlink and ipv6_route targets, using
the same seq_ops (except show() and minor changes for stop())
for /proc/net/{netlink,ipv6_route}.
The net namespace for these targets are the current net
namespace at file open stage, similar to
/proc/net/{netlink,ipv6_route} reference counting
the net namespace at seq_file open stage.
Since module is not supported for now, ipv6_route is
supported only if the IPV6 is built-in, i.e., not compiled
as a module. The restriction can be lifted once module
is properly supported for bpf_iter.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175910.2476329-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit e5158d987b72c3f318b4b52a01ac6f3997bd0c00]
Macro DEFINE_BPF_ITER_FUNC is implemented so target
can define an init function to capture the BTF type
which represents the target.
The bpf_iter_meta is a structure holding meta data, common
to all targets in the bpf program.
Additional marker functions are called before or after
bpf_seq_read() show()/next()/stop() callback functions
to help calculate precise seq_num and whether call bpf_prog
inside stop().
Two functions, bpf_iter_get_info() and bpf_iter_run_prog(),
are implemented so target can get needed information from
bpf_iter infrastructure and can run the program.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175907.2475956-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 367ec3e4834cbd611401c2c40a23c22c825474f1]
To produce a file bpf iterator, the fd must be
corresponding to a link_fd assocciated with a
trace/iter program. When the pinned file is
opened, a seq_file will be generated.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175906.2475893-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit ac51d99bf81caac8d8881fe52098948110d0de68]
A new bpf command BPF_ITER_CREATE is added.
The anonymous bpf iterator is seq_file based.
The seq_file private data are referenced by targets.
The bpf_iter infrastructure allocated additional space
at seq_file->private before the space used by targets
to store some meta data, e.g.,
prog: prog to run
session_id: an unique id for each opened seq_file
seq_num: how many times bpf programs are queried in this session
done_stop: an internal state to decide whether bpf program
should be called in seq_ops->stop() or not
The seq_num will start from 0 for valid objects.
The bpf program may see the same seq_num more than once if
- seq_file buffer overflow happens and the same object
is retried by bpf_seq_read(), or
- the bpf program explicitly requests a retry of the
same object
Since module is not supported for bpf_iter, all target
registeration happens at __init time, so there is no
need to change bpf_iter_unreg_target() as it is used
mostly in error path of the init function at which time
no bpf iterators have been created yet.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175905.2475770-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit de4e05cac46d206f9090051ef09930514bff73e4]
Given a bpf program, the step to create an anonymous bpf iterator is:
- create a bpf_iter_link, which combines bpf program and the target.
In the future, there could be more information recorded in the link.
A link_fd will be returned to the user space.
- create an anonymous bpf iterator with the given link_fd.
The bpf_iter_link can be pinned to bpffs mount file system to
create a file based bpf iterator as well.
The benefit to use of bpf_iter_link:
- using bpf link simplifies design and implementation as bpf link
is used for other tracing bpf programs.
- for file based bpf iterator, bpf_iter_link provides a standard
way to replace underlying bpf programs.
- for both anonymous and free based iterators, bpf link query
capability can be leveraged.
The patch added support of tracing/iter programs for BPF_LINK_CREATE.
A new link type BPF_LINK_TYPE_ITER is added to facilitate link
querying. Currently, only prog_id is needed, so there is no
additional in-kernel show_fdinfo() and fill_link_info() hook
is needed for BPF_LINK_TYPE_ITER link.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175901.2475084-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit 15d83c4d7cef5c067a8b075ce59e97df4f60706e]
A bpf_iter program is a tracing program with attach type
BPF_TRACE_ITER. The load attribute
attach_btf_id
is used by the verifier against a particular kernel function,
which represents a target, e.g., __bpf_iter__bpf_map
for target bpf_map which is implemented later.
The program return value must be 0 or 1 for now.
0 : successful, except potential seq_file buffer overflow
which is handled by seq_file reader.
1 : request to restart the same object
In the future, other return values may be used for filtering or
teminating the iterator.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175900.2474947-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit ae24345da54e452880808b011fa2d8a0bbd191ba]
The target can call bpf_iter_reg_target() to register itself.
The needed information:
target: target name
seq_ops: the seq_file operations for the target
init_seq_private target callback to initialize seq_priv during file open
fini_seq_private target callback to clean up seq_priv during file release
seq_priv_size: the private_data size needed by the seq_file
operations
The target name represents a target which provides a seq_ops
for iterating objects.
The target can provide two callback functions, init_seq_private
and fini_seq_private, called during file open/release time.
For example, /proc/net/{tcp6, ipv6_route, netlink, ...}, net
name space needs to be setup properly during file open and
released properly during file release.
Function bpf_iter_unreg_target() is also implemented to unregister
a particular target.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200509175859.2474669-1-yhs@fb.com
[upstream commit ba423fdaa589d972473083defedf9e862626d268]
Add a uptr_t type that can hold a pointer to either a user or kernel
memory region, and simply helpers to copy to and from it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[upstream commit 72f7e9440e9bd06f855b21eba09c1017395f430a]
Following INET/TCP socket lookup changes, modify UDP socket lookup to let
BPF program select a receiving socket before searching for a socket by
destination address and port as usual.
Lookup of connected sockets that match packet 4-tuple is unaffected by this
change. BPF program runs, and potentially overrides the lookup result, only
if a 4-tuple match was not found.
Suggested-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200717103536.397595-9-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit 1122702f02678597c4f1c7d316365ef502aafe08]
Following ipv4 stack changes, run a BPF program attached to netns before
looking up a listening socket. Program can return a listening socket to use
as result of socket lookup, fail the lookup, or take no action.
Suggested-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200717103536.397595-7-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit 1559b4aa1db443096af493c7d621dc156054babe]
Run a BPF program before looking up a listening socket on the receive path.
Program selects a listening socket to yield as result of socket lookup by
calling bpf_sk_assign() helper and returning SK_PASS code. Program can
revert its decision by assigning a NULL socket with bpf_sk_assign().
Alternatively, BPF program can also fail the lookup by returning with
SK_DROP, or let the lookup continue as usual with SK_PASS on return, when
no socket has been selected with bpf_sk_assign().
This lets the user match packets with listening sockets freely at the last
possible point on the receive path, where we know that packets are destined
for local delivery after undergoing policing, filtering, and routing.
With BPF code selecting the socket, directing packets destined to an IP
range or to a port range to a single socket becomes possible.
In case multiple programs are attached, they are run in series in the order
in which they were attached. The end result is determined from return codes
of all the programs according to following rules:
1. If any program returned SK_PASS and selected a valid socket, the socket
is used as result of socket lookup.
2. If more than one program returned SK_PASS and selected a socket,
last selection takes effect.
3. If any program returned SK_DROP, and no program returned SK_PASS and
selected a socket, socket lookup fails with -ECONNREFUSED.
4. If all programs returned SK_PASS and none of them selected a socket,
socket lookup continues to htable-based lookup.
Suggested-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200717103536.397595-5-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit e9ddbb7707ff5891616240026062b8c1e29864ca]
Add a new program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP with a dedicated attach type
BPF_SK_LOOKUP. The new program kind is to be invoked by the transport layer
when looking up a listening socket for a new connection request for
connection oriented protocols, or when looking up an unconnected socket for
a packet for connection-less protocols.
When called, SK_LOOKUP BPF program can select a socket that will receive
the packet. This serves as a mechanism to overcome the limits of what
bind() API allows to express. Two use-cases driving this work are:
(1) steer packets destined to an IP range, on fixed port to a socket
192.0.2.0/24, port 80 -> NGINX socket
(2) steer packets destined to an IP address, on any port to a socket
198.51.100.1, any port -> L7 proxy socket
In its run-time context program receives information about the packet that
triggered the socket lookup. Namely IP version, L4 protocol identifier, and
address 4-tuple. Context can be further extended to include ingress
interface identifier.
To select a socket BPF program fetches it from a map holding socket
references, like SOCKMAP or SOCKHASH, and calls bpf_sk_assign(ctx, sk, ...)
helper to record the selection. Transport layer then uses the selected
socket as a result of socket lookup.
In its basic form, SK_LOOKUP acts as a filter and hence must return either
SK_PASS or SK_DROP. If the program returns with SK_PASS, transport should
look for a socket to receive the packet, or use the one selected by the
program if available, while SK_DROP informs the transport layer that the
lookup should fail.
This patch only enables the user to attach an SK_LOOKUP program to a
network namespace. Subsequent patches hook it up to run on local delivery
path in ipv4 and ipv6 stacks.
Suggested-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200717103536.397595-3-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit ce3aa9cc5109363099b7c4ac82e2c9768afcaf31]
Extend the BPF netns link callbacks to rebuild (grow/shrink) or update the
prog_array at given position when link gets attached/updated/released.
This let's us lift the limit of having just one link attached for the new
attach type introduced by subsequent patch.
No functional changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200717103536.397595-2-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit 7f045a49fee04b5662cbdeaf0838f9322ae8c63a]
Extend bpf() syscall subcommands that operate on bpf_link, that is
LINK_CREATE, LINK_UPDATE, OBJ_GET_INFO, to accept attach types tied to
network namespaces (only flow dissector at the moment).
Link-based and prog-based attachment can be used interchangeably, but only
one can exist at a time. Attempts to attach a link when a prog is already
attached directly, and the other way around, will be met with -EEXIST.
Attempts to detach a program when link exists result in -EINVAL.
Attachment of multiple links of same attach type to one netns is not
supported with the intention to lift the restriction when a use-case
presents itself. Because of that link create returns -E2BIG when trying to
create another netns link, when one already exists.
Link-based attachments to netns don't keep a netns alive by holding a ref
to it. Instead links get auto-detached from netns when the latter is being
destroyed, using a pernet pre_exit callback.
When auto-detached, link lives in defunct state as long there are open FDs
for it. -ENOLINK is returned if a user tries to update a defunct link.
Because bpf_link to netns doesn't hold a ref to struct net, special care is
taken when releasing, updating, or filling link info. The netns might be
getting torn down when any of these link operations are in progress. That
is why auto-detach and update/release/fill_info are synchronized by the
same mutex. Also, link ops have to always check if auto-detach has not
happened yet and if netns is still alive (refcnt > 0).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200531082846.2117903-5-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit a3fd7ceee05431d2c51ed86c6cae015d236a51f0]
In order to:
(1) attach more than one BPF program type to netns, or
(2) support attaching BPF programs to netns with bpf_link, or
(3) support multi-prog attach points for netns
we will need to keep more state per netns than a single pointer like we
have now for BPF flow dissector program.
Prepare for the above by extracting netns_bpf that is part of struct net,
for storing all state related to BPF programs attached to netns.
Turn flow dissector callbacks for querying/attaching/detaching a program
into generic ones that operate on netns_bpf. Next patch will move the
generic callbacks into their own module.
This is similar to how it is organized for cgroup with cgroup_bpf.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200531082846.2117903-3-jakub@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit a63fc6b75cca984c71f095282e0227a390ba88f3]
Although the rcu_swap_protected() macro follows the example of
swap(), the interactions with RCU make its update of its argument
somewhat counter-intuitive. This commit therefore introduces
an rcu_replace_pointer() that returns the old value of the RCU
pointer instead of doing the argument update. Once all the uses of
rcu_swap_protected() are updated to instead use rcu_replace_pointer(),
rcu_swap_protected() will be removed.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiAsJLw1egFEE=Z7-GGtM6wcvtyytXZA1+BHqta4gg6Hw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ paulmck: From rcu_replace() to rcu_replace_pointer() per Ingo Molnar. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Shane M Seymour <shane.seymour@hpe.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[upstream commit f2e10bff16a0fdd41ba278c84da9813700e356af]
Add ability to fetch bpf_link details through BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD command.
Also enhance show_fdinfo to potentially include bpf_link type-specific
information (similarly to obj_info).
Also introduce enum bpf_link_type stored in bpf_link itself and expose it in
UAPI. bpf_link_tracing also now will store and return bpf_attach_type.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200429001614.1544-5-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit a3b80e1078943dc12553166fb08e258463dec013]
Generate ID for each bpf_link using IDR, similarly to bpf_map and bpf_prog.
bpf_link creation, initialization, attachment, and exposing to user-space
through FD and ID is a complicated multi-step process, abstract it away
through bpf_link_primer and bpf_link_prime(), bpf_link_settle(), and
bpf_link_cleanup() internal API. They guarantee that until bpf_link is
properly attached, user-space won't be able to access partially-initialized
bpf_link either from FD or ID. All this allows to simplify bpf_link attachment
and error handling code.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200429001614.1544-3-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit f9d041271cf44ca02eed0cc82e1a6d8c814c53ed]
Make bpf_link update support more generic by making it into another
bpf_link_ops methods. This allows generic syscall handling code to be agnostic
to various conditionally compiled features (e.g., the case of
CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF). This also allows to keep link type-specific code to remain
static within respective code base. Refactor existing bpf_cgroup_link code and
take advantage of this.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200429001614.1544-2-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit 980737282232b752bb14dab96d77665c15889c36]
Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
[upstream commit babf3164095b0670435910340c2a1eec37757b57]
Add bpf_link_new_file() API for cases when we need to ensure anon_inode is
successfully created before we proceed with expensive BPF program attachment
procedure, which will require equally (if not more so) expensive and
potentially failing compensation detachment procedure just because anon_inode
creation failed. This API allows to simplify code by ensuring first that
anon_inode is created and after BPF program is attached proceed with
fd_install() that can't fail.
After anon_inode file is created, link can't be just kfree()'d anymore,
because its destruction will be performed by deferred file_operations->release
call. For this, bpf_link API required specifying two separate operations:
release() and dealloc(), former performing detachment only, while the latter
frees memory used by bpf_link itself. dealloc() needs to be specified, because
struct bpf_link is frequently embedded into link type-specific container
struct (e.g., struct bpf_raw_tp_link), so bpf_link itself doesn't know how to
properly free the memory. In case when anon_inode file was successfully
created, but subsequent BPF attachment failed, bpf_link needs to be marked as
"defunct", so that file's release() callback will perform only memory
deallocation, but no detachment.
Convert raw tracepoint and tracing attachment to new API and eliminate
detachment from error handling path.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200309231051.1270337-1-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit 0c991ebc8c69d29b7fc44db17075c5aa5253e2ab]
Add new operation (LINK_UPDATE), which allows to replace active bpf_prog from
under given bpf_link. Currently this is only supported for bpf_cgroup_link,
but will be extended to other kinds of bpf_links in follow-up patches.
For bpf_cgroup_link, implemented functionality matches existing semantics for
direct bpf_prog attachment (including BPF_F_REPLACE flag). User can either
unconditionally set new bpf_prog regardless of which bpf_prog is currently
active under given bpf_link, or, optionally, can specify expected active
bpf_prog. If active bpf_prog doesn't match expected one, no changes are
performed, old bpf_link stays intact and attached, operation returns
a failure.
cgroup_bpf_replace() operation is resolving race between auto-detachment and
bpf_prog update in the same fashion as it's done for bpf_link detachment,
except in this case update has no way of succeeding because of target cgroup
marked as dying. So in this case error is returned.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200330030001.2312810-3-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit af6eea57437a830293eab56246b6025cc7d46ee7]
Implement new sub-command to attach cgroup BPF programs and return FD-based
bpf_link back on success. bpf_link, once attached to cgroup, cannot be
replaced, except by owner having its FD. Cgroup bpf_link supports only
BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI semantics. Both link-based and prog-based BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI
attachments can be freely intermixed.
To prevent bpf_cgroup_link from keeping cgroup alive past the point when no
BPF program can be executed, implement auto-detachment of link. When
cgroup_bpf_release() is called, all attached bpf_links are forced to release
cgroup refcounts, but they leave bpf_link otherwise active and allocated, as
well as still owning underlying bpf_prog. This is because user-space might
still have FDs open and active, so bpf_link as a user-referenced object can't
be freed yet. Once last active FD is closed, bpf_link will be freed and
underlying bpf_prog refcount will be dropped. But cgroup refcount won't be
touched, because cgroup is released already.
The inherent race between bpf_cgroup_link release (from closing last FD) and
cgroup_bpf_release() is resolved by both operations taking cgroup_mutex. So
the only additional check required is when bpf_cgroup_link attempts to detach
itself from cgroup. At that time we need to check whether there is still
cgroup associated with that link. And if not, exit with success, because
bpf_cgroup_link was already successfully detached.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200330030001.2312810-2-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit 7dd68b3279f1792103d12e69933db3128c6d416e]
The common use-case in production is to have multiple cgroup-bpf
programs per attach type that cover multiple use-cases. Such programs
are attached with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI and can be maintained by different
people.
Order of programs usually matters, for example imagine two egress
programs: the first one drops packets and the second one counts packets.
If they're swapped the result of counting program will be different.
It brings operational challenges with updating cgroup-bpf program(s)
attached with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI since there is no way to replace a
program:
* One way to update is to detach all programs first and then attach the
new version(s) again in the right order. This introduces an
interruption in the work a program is doing and may not be acceptable
(e.g. if it's egress firewall);
* Another way is attach the new version of a program first and only then
detach the old version. This introduces the time interval when two
versions of same program are working, what may not be acceptable if a
program is not idempotent. It also imposes additional burden on
program developers to make sure that two versions of their program can
co-exist.
Solve the problem by introducing a "replace" mode in BPF_PROG_ATTACH
command for cgroup-bpf programs being attached with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI
flag. This mode is enabled by newly introduced BPF_F_REPLACE attach flag
and bpf_attr.replace_bpf_fd attribute to pass fd of the old program to
replace
That way user can replace any program among those attached with
BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag without the problems described above.
Details of the new API:
* If BPF_F_REPLACE is set but replace_bpf_fd doesn't have valid
descriptor of BPF program, BPF_PROG_ATTACH will return corresponding
error (EINVAL or EBADF).
* If replace_bpf_fd has valid descriptor of BPF program but such a
program is not attached to specified cgroup, BPF_PROG_ATTACH will
return ENOENT.
BPF_F_REPLACE is introduced to make the user intent clear, since
replace_bpf_fd alone can't be used for this (its default value, 0, is a
valid fd). BPF_F_REPLACE also makes it possible to extend the API in the
future (e.g. add BPF_F_BEFORE and BPF_F_AFTER if needed).
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Narkyiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/30cd850044a0057bdfcaaf154b7d2f39850ba813.1576741281.git.rdna@fb.com
[upstream commit 70ed506c3bbcfa846d4636b23051ca79fa4781f7]
Introduce bpf_link abstraction, representing an attachment of BPF program to
a BPF hook point (e.g., tracepoint, perf event, etc). bpf_link encapsulates
ownership of attached BPF program, reference counting of a link itself, when
reference from multiple anonymous inodes, as well as ensures that release
callback will be called from a process context, so that users can safely take
mutex locks and sleep.
Additionally, with a new abstraction it's now possible to generalize pinning
of a link object in BPF FS, allowing to explicitly prevent BPF program
detachment on process exit by pinning it in a BPF FS and let it open from
independent other process to keep working with it.
Convert two existing bpf_link-like objects (raw tracepoint and tracing BPF
program attachments) into utilizing bpf_link framework, making them pinnable
in BPF FS. More FD-based bpf_links will be added in follow up patches.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200303043159.323675-2-andriin@fb.com
[upstream commit 54261af473be4c5481f6196064445d2945f2bdab]
security_fs_context_parse_param is called by vfs_parse_fs_param and
a succussful return value (i.e 0) implies that a parameter will be
consumed by the LSM framework. This stops all further parsing of the
parmeter by VFS. Furthermore, if an LSM hook returns a success, the
remaining LSM hooks are not invoked for the parameter.
The current default behavior of returning success means that all the
parameters are expected to be parsed by the LSM hook and none of them
end up being populated by vfs in fs_context
This was noticed when lsm=bpf is supplied on the command line before any
other LSM. As the bpf lsm uses this default value to implement a default
hook, this resulted in a failure to parse any fs_context parameters and
a failure to mount the root filesystem.
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Reported-by: Mikko Ylinen <mikko.ylinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[upstream commit 9e4e01dfd3254c7f04f24b7c6b29596bc12332f3]
JITed BPF programs are dynamically attached to the LSM hooks
using BPF trampolines. The trampoline prologue generates code to handle
conversion of the signature of the hook to the appropriate BPF context.
The allocated trampoline programs are attached to the nop functions
initialized as LSM hooks.
BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs must have a GPL compatible license and
and need CAP_SYS_ADMIN (required for loading eBPF programs).
Upon attachment:
* A BPF fexit trampoline is used for LSM hooks with a void return type.
* A BPF fmod_ret trampoline is used for LSM hooks which return an
int. The attached programs can override the return value of the
bpf LSM hook to indicate a MAC Policy decision.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-5-kpsingh@chromium.org
[upstream commit 9d3fdea789c8fab51381c2d609932fabe94c0517]
When CONFIG_BPF_LSM is enabled, nop functions, bpf_lsm_<hook_name>, are
generated for each LSM hook. These functions are initialized as LSM
hooks in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-4-kpsingh@chromium.org
[upstream commit 98e828a0650f348be85728c69875260cf78069e6]
The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered
in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and
struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information
even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the
LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all
the data structures required by the LSM framework.
The LSM hooks are defined as:
LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...)
with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as:
LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
[upstream commit fc611f47f2188ade2b48ff6902d5cce8baac0c58]
Introduce types and configs for bpf programs that can be attached to
LSM hooks. The programs can be enabled by the config option
CONFIG_BPF_LSM.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
[upstream commit ae24082331d9bbaae283aafbe930a8f0eb85605a]
When multiple programs are attached, each program receives the return
value from the previous program on the stack and the last program
provides the return value to the attached function.
The fmod_ret bpf programs are run after the fentry programs and before
the fexit programs. The original function is only called if all the
fmod_ret programs return 0 to avoid any unintended side-effects. The
success value, i.e. 0 is not currently configurable but can be made so
where user-space can specify it at load time.
For example:
int func_to_be_attached(int a, int b)
{ <--- do_fentry
do_fmod_ret:
<update ret by calling fmod_ret>
if (ret != 0)
goto do_fexit;
original_function:
<side_effects_happen_here>
} <--- do_fexit
The fmod_ret program attached to this function can be defined as:
SEC("fmod_ret/func_to_be_attached")
int BPF_PROG(func_name, int a, int b, int ret)
{
// This will skip the original function logic.
return 1;
}
The first fmod_ret program is passed 0 in its return argument.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200304191853.1529-4-kpsingh@chromium.org
[upstream commit 88fd9e5352fe05f7fe57778293aebd4cd106960b]
As we need to introduce a third type of attachment for trampolines, the
flattened signature of arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline gets even more
complicated.
Refactor the prog and count argument to arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline to
use bpf_tramp_progs to simplify the addition and accounting for new
attachment types.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200304191853.1529-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
[upstream commit be8704ff07d2374bcc5c675526f95e70c6459683]
Introduce dynamic program extensions. The users can load additional BPF
functions and replace global functions in previously loaded BPF programs while
these programs are executing.
Global functions are verified individually by the verifier based on their types only.
Hence the global function in the new program which types match older function can
safely replace that corresponding function.
This new function/program is called 'an extension' of old program. At load time
the verifier uses (attach_prog_fd, attach_btf_id) pair to identify the function
to be replaced. The BPF program type is derived from the target program into
extension program. Technically bpf_verifier_ops is copied from target program.
The BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program type is a placeholder. It has empty verifier_ops.
The extension program can call the same bpf helper functions as target program.
Single BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT type is used to extend XDP, SKB and all other program
types. The verifier allows only one level of replacement. Meaning that the
extension program cannot recursively extend an extension. That also means that
the maximum stack size is increasing from 512 to 1024 bytes and maximum
function nesting level from 8 to 16. The programs don't always consume that
much. The stack usage is determined by the number of on-stack variables used by
the program. The verifier could have enforced 512 limit for combined original
plus extension program, but it makes for difficult user experience. The main
use case for extensions is to provide generic mechanism to plug external
programs into policy program or function call chaining.
BPF trampoline is used to track both fentry/fexit and program extensions
because both are using the same nop slot at the beginning of every BPF
function. Attaching fentry/fexit to a function that was replaced is not
allowed. The opposite is true as well. Replacing a function that currently
being analyzed with fentry/fexit is not allowed. The executable page allocated
by BPF trampoline is not used by program extensions. This inefficiency will be
optimized in future patches.
Function by function verification of global function supports scalars and
pointer to context only. Hence program extensions are supported for such class
of global functions only. In the future the verifier will be extended with
support to pointers to structures, arrays with sizes, etc.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200121005348.2769920-2-ast@kernel.org
[upstream commit f747632b608f90217a4e9ebb1deba8a37612aa32]
The init, close and unhash handlers from TCP sockmap are generic,
and can be reused by UDP sockmap. Move the helpers into the sockmap code
base and expose them. This requires tcp_bpf_get_proto and tcp_bpf_clone to
be conditional on BPF_STREAM_PARSER.
The moved functions are unmodified, except that sk_psock_unlink is
renamed to sock_map_unlink to better match its behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200309111243.6982-6-lmb@cloudflare.com
[upstream commit 1a2e20132db7bb76dd4f97b8364bd167227dd15f]
Only update psock->saved_* if psock->sk_proto has not been initialized
yet. This allows us to get rid of tcp_bpf_reinit_sk_prot.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200309111243.6982-3-lmb@cloudflare.com
Andrey Ignatov