[upstream commit be8704ff07d2374bcc5c675526f95e70c6459683]
Introduce dynamic program extensions. The users can load additional BPF
functions and replace global functions in previously loaded BPF programs while
these programs are executing.
Global functions are verified individually by the verifier based on their types only.
Hence the global function in the new program which types match older function can
safely replace that corresponding function.
This new function/program is called 'an extension' of old program. At load time
the verifier uses (attach_prog_fd, attach_btf_id) pair to identify the function
to be replaced. The BPF program type is derived from the target program into
extension program. Technically bpf_verifier_ops is copied from target program.
The BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program type is a placeholder. It has empty verifier_ops.
The extension program can call the same bpf helper functions as target program.
Single BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT type is used to extend XDP, SKB and all other program
types. The verifier allows only one level of replacement. Meaning that the
extension program cannot recursively extend an extension. That also means that
the maximum stack size is increasing from 512 to 1024 bytes and maximum
function nesting level from 8 to 16. The programs don't always consume that
much. The stack usage is determined by the number of on-stack variables used by
the program. The verifier could have enforced 512 limit for combined original
plus extension program, but it makes for difficult user experience. The main
use case for extensions is to provide generic mechanism to plug external
programs into policy program or function call chaining.
BPF trampoline is used to track both fentry/fexit and program extensions
because both are using the same nop slot at the beginning of every BPF
function. Attaching fentry/fexit to a function that was replaced is not
allowed. The opposite is true as well. Replacing a function that currently
being analyzed with fentry/fexit is not allowed. The executable page allocated
by BPF trampoline is not used by program extensions. This inefficiency will be
optimized in future patches.
Function by function verification of global function supports scalars and
pointer to context only. Hence program extensions are supported for such class
of global functions only. In the future the verifier will be extended with
support to pointers to structures, arrays with sizes, etc.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200121005348.2769920-2-ast@kernel.org
[upstream commit 51c39bb1d5d105a02e29aa7960f0a395086e6342]
New llvm and old llvm with libbpf help produce BTF that distinguish global and
static functions. Unlike arguments of static function the arguments of global
functions cannot be removed or optimized away by llvm. The compiler has to use
exactly the arguments specified in a function prototype. The argument type
information allows the verifier validate each global function independently.
For now only supported argument types are pointer to context and scalars. In
the future pointers to structures, sizes, pointer to packet data can be
supported as well. Consider the following example:
static int f1(int ...)
{
...
}
int f3(int b);
int f2(int a)
{
f1(a) + f3(a);
}
int f3(int b)
{
...
}
int main(...)
{
f1(...) + f2(...) + f3(...);
}
The verifier will start its safety checks from the first global function f2().
It will recursively descend into f1() because it's static. Then it will check
that arguments match for the f3() invocation inside f2(). It will not descend
into f3(). It will finish f2() that has to be successfully verified for all
possible values of 'a'. Then it will proceed with f3(). That function also has
to be safe for all possible values of 'b'. Then it will start subprog 0 (which
is main() function). It will recursively descend into f1() and will skip full
check of f2() and f3(), since they are global. The order of processing global
functions doesn't affect safety, since all global functions must be proven safe
based on their arguments only.
Such function by function verification can drastically improve speed of the
verification and reduce complexity.
Note that the stack limit of 512 still applies to the call chain regardless whether
functions were static or global. The nested level of 8 also still applies. The
same recursion prevention checks are in place as well.
The type information and static/global kind is preserved after the verification
hence in the above example global function f2() and f3() can be replaced later
by equivalent functions with the same types that are loaded and verified later
without affecting safety of this main() program. Such replacement (re-linking)
of global functions is a subject of future patches.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200110064124.1760511-3-ast@kernel.org
[upstream commit 206057fe020ac5c037d5e2dd6562a9bd216ec765]
Add a helper to send out a tcp-ack. It will be used in the later
bpf_dctcp implementation that requires to send out an ack
when the CE state changed.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200109004551.3900448-1-kafai@fb.com
[upstream commit 85d33df357b634649ddbe0a20fd2d0fc5732c3cb]
The patch introduces BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS. The map value
is a kernel struct with its func ptr implemented in bpf prog.
This new map is the interface to register/unregister/introspect
a bpf implemented kernel struct.
The kernel struct is actually embedded inside another new struct
(or called the "value" struct in the code). For example,
"struct tcp_congestion_ops" is embbeded in:
struct bpf_struct_ops_tcp_congestion_ops {
refcount_t refcnt;
enum bpf_struct_ops_state state;
struct tcp_congestion_ops data; /* <-- kernel subsystem struct here */
}
The map value is "struct bpf_struct_ops_tcp_congestion_ops".
The "bpftool map dump" will then be able to show the
state ("inuse"/"tobefree") and the number of subsystem's refcnt (e.g.
number of tcp_sock in the tcp_congestion_ops case). This "value" struct
is created automatically by a macro. Having a separate "value" struct
will also make extending "struct bpf_struct_ops_XYZ" easier (e.g. adding
"void (*init)(void)" to "struct bpf_struct_ops_XYZ" to do some
initialization works before registering the struct_ops to the kernel
subsystem). The libbpf will take care of finding and populating the
"struct bpf_struct_ops_XYZ" from "struct XYZ".
Register a struct_ops to a kernel subsystem:
1. Load all needed BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog(s)
2. Create a BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS with attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id
set to the btf id "struct bpf_struct_ops_tcp_congestion_ops" of the
running kernel.
Instead of reusing the attr->btf_value_type_id,
btf_vmlinux_value_type_id s added such that attr->btf_fd can still be
used as the "user" btf which could store other useful sysadmin/debug
info that may be introduced in the furture,
e.g. creation-date/compiler-details/map-creator...etc.
3. Create a "struct bpf_struct_ops_tcp_congestion_ops" object as described
in the running kernel btf. Populate the value of this object.
The function ptr should be populated with the prog fds.
4. Call BPF_MAP_UPDATE with the object created in (3) as
the map value. The key is always "0".
During BPF_MAP_UPDATE, the code that saves the kernel-func-ptr's
args as an array of u64 is generated. BPF_MAP_UPDATE also allows
the specific struct_ops to do some final checks in "st_ops->init_member()"
(e.g. ensure all mandatory func ptrs are implemented).
If everything looks good, it will register this kernel struct
to the kernel subsystem. The map will not allow further update
from this point.
Unregister a struct_ops from the kernel subsystem:
BPF_MAP_DELETE with key "0".
Introspect a struct_ops:
BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM with key "0". The map value returned will
have the prog _id_ populated as the func ptr.
The map value state (enum bpf_struct_ops_state) will transit from:
INIT (map created) =>
INUSE (map updated, i.e. reg) =>
TOBEFREE (map value deleted, i.e. unreg)
The kernel subsystem needs to call bpf_struct_ops_get() and
bpf_struct_ops_put() to manage the "refcnt" in the
"struct bpf_struct_ops_XYZ". This patch uses a separate refcnt
for the purose of tracking the subsystem usage. Another approach
is to reuse the map->refcnt and then "show" (i.e. during map_lookup)
the subsystem's usage by doing map->refcnt - map->usercnt to filter out
the map-fd/pinned-map usage. However, that will also tie down the
future semantics of map->refcnt and map->usercnt.
The very first subsystem's refcnt (during reg()) holds one
count to map->refcnt. When the very last subsystem's refcnt
is gone, it will also release the map->refcnt. All bpf_prog will be
freed when the map->refcnt reaches 0 (i.e. during map_free()).
Here is how the bpftool map command will look like:
[root@arch-fb-vm1 bpf]# bpftool map show
6: struct_ops name dctcp flags 0x0
key 4B value 256B max_entries 1 memlock 4096B
btf_id 6
[root@arch-fb-vm1 bpf]# bpftool map dump id 6
[{
"value": {
"refcnt": {
"refs": {
"counter": 1
}
},
"state": 1,
"data": {
"list": {
"next": 0,
"prev": 0
},
"key": 0,
"flags": 2,
"init": 24,
"release": 0,
"ssthresh": 25,
"cong_avoid": 30,
"set_state": 27,
"cwnd_event": 28,
"in_ack_event": 26,
"undo_cwnd": 29,
"pkts_acked": 0,
"min_tso_segs": 0,
"sndbuf_expand": 0,
"cong_control": 0,
"get_info": 0,
"name": [98,112,102,95,100,99,116,99,112,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
],
"owner": 0
}
}
}
]
Misc Notes:
* bpf_struct_ops_map_sys_lookup_elem() is added for syscall lookup.
It does an inplace update on "*value" instead returning a pointer
to syscall.c. Otherwise, it needs a separate copy of "zero" value
for the BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_INIT to avoid races.
* The bpf_struct_ops_map_delete_elem() is also called without
preempt_disable() from map_delete_elem(). It is because
the "->unreg()" may requires sleepable context, e.g.
the "tcp_unregister_congestion_control()".
* "const" is added to some of the existing "struct btf_func_model *"
function arg to avoid a compiler warning caused by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200109003505.3855919-1-kafai@fb.com
[upstream commit 27ae7997a66174cb8afd6a75b3989f5e0c1b9e5a]
This patch allows the kernel's struct ops (i.e. func ptr) to be
implemented in BPF. The first use case in this series is the
"struct tcp_congestion_ops" which will be introduced in a
latter patch.
This patch introduces a new prog type BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS.
The BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog is verified against a particular
func ptr of a kernel struct. The attr->attach_btf_id is the btf id
of a kernel struct. The attr->expected_attach_type is the member
"index" of that kernel struct. The first member of a struct starts
with member index 0. That will avoid ambiguity when a kernel struct
has multiple func ptrs with the same func signature.
For example, a BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog is written
to implement the "init" func ptr of the "struct tcp_congestion_ops".
The attr->attach_btf_id is the btf id of the "struct tcp_congestion_ops"
of the _running_ kernel. The attr->expected_attach_type is 3.
The ctx of BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS is an array of u64 args saved
by arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline that will be done in the next
patch when introducing BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS.
"struct bpf_struct_ops" is introduced as a common interface for the kernel
struct that supports BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog. The supporting kernel
struct will need to implement an instance of the "struct bpf_struct_ops".
The supporting kernel struct also needs to implement a bpf_verifier_ops.
During BPF_PROG_LOAD, bpf_struct_ops_find() will find the right
bpf_verifier_ops by searching the attr->attach_btf_id.
A new "btf_struct_access" is also added to the bpf_verifier_ops such
that the supporting kernel struct can optionally provide its own specific
check on accessing the func arg (e.g. provide limited write access).
After btf_vmlinux is parsed, the new bpf_struct_ops_init() is called
to initialize some values (e.g. the btf id of the supporting kernel
struct) and it can only be done once the btf_vmlinux is available.
The R0 checks at BPF_EXIT is excluded for the BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog
if the return type of the prog->aux->attach_func_proto is "void".
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200109003503.3855825-1-kafai@fb.com
[upstream commit 5b92a28aae4dd0f88778d540ecfdcdaec5a41723]
Allow FENTRY/FEXIT BPF programs to attach to other BPF programs of any type
including their subprograms. This feature allows snooping on input and output
packets in XDP, TC programs including their return values. In order to do that
the verifier needs to track types not only of vmlinux, but types of other BPF
programs as well. The verifier also needs to translate uapi/linux/bpf.h types
used by networking programs into kernel internal BTF types used by FENTRY/FEXIT
BPF programs. In some cases LLVM optimizations can remove arguments from BPF
subprograms without adjusting BTF info that LLVM backend knows. When BTF info
disagrees with actual types that the verifiers sees the BPF trampoline has to
fallback to conservative and treat all arguments as u64. The FENTRY/FEXIT
program can still attach to such subprograms, but it won't be able to recognize
pointer types like 'struct sk_buff *' and it won't be able to pass them to
bpf_skb_output() for dumping packets to user space. The FENTRY/FEXIT program
would need to use bpf_probe_read_kernel() instead.
The BPF_PROG_LOAD command is extended with attach_prog_fd field. When it's set
to zero the attach_btf_id is one vmlinux BTF type ids. When attach_prog_fd
points to previously loaded BPF program the attach_btf_id is BTF type id of
main function or one of its subprograms.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-18-ast@kernel.org
[upstream commit 6ae08ae3dea2cfa03dd3665a3c8475c2d429ef47]
The current bpf_probe_read() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers are broken
in that they assume they can be used for probing memory access for kernel
space addresses /as well as/ user space addresses.
However, plain use of probe_kernel_read() for both cases will attempt to
always access kernel space address space given access is performed under
KERNEL_DS and some archs in-fact have overlapping address spaces where a
kernel pointer and user pointer would have the /same/ address value and
therefore accessing application memory via bpf_probe_read{,_str}() would
read garbage values.
Lets fix BPF side by making use of recently added 3d7081822f7f ("uaccess:
Add non-pagefault user-space read functions"). Unfortunately, the only way
to fix this status quo is to add dedicated bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}()
and bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}_str() helpers. The bpf_probe_read{,_str}()
helpers are kept as-is to retain their current behavior.
The two *_user() variants attempt the access always under USER_DS set, the
two *_kernel() variants will -EFAULT when accessing user memory if the
underlying architecture has non-overlapping address ranges, also avoiding
throwing the kernel warning via 00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for
non-canonical user access address dereferences").
Fixes: a5e8c07059d0 ("bpf: add bpf_probe_read_str helper")
Fixes: 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/796ee46e948bc808d54891a1108435f8652c6ca4.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
[upstream commit f1b9509c2fb0ef4db8d22dac9aef8e856a5d81f6]
The bpf program type raw_tp together with 'expected_attach_type'
was the most appropriate api to indicate BTF-enabled raw_tp programs.
But during development it became apparent that 'expected_attach_type'
cannot be used and new 'attach_btf_id' field had to be introduced.
Which means that the information is duplicated in two fields where
one of them is ignored.
Clean it up by introducing new program type where both
'expected_attach_type' and 'attach_btf_id' fields have
specific meaning.
In the future 'expected_attach_type' will be extended
with other attach points that have similar semantics to raw_tp.
This patch is replacing BTF-enabled BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT with
prog_type = BPF_RPOG_TYPE_TRACING
expected_attach_type = BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP
attach_btf_id = btf_id of raw tracepoint inside the kernel
Future patches will add
expected_attach_type = BPF_TRACE_FENTRY or BPF_TRACE_FEXIT
where programs have the same input context and the same helpers,
but different attach points.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191030223212.953010-2-ast@kernel.org
Add attach_btf_id attribute to prog_load command.
It's similar to existing expected_attach_type attribute which is
used in several cgroup based program types.
Unfortunately expected_attach_type is ignored for
tracing programs and cannot be reused for new purpose.
Hence introduce attach_btf_id to verify bpf programs against
given in-kernel BTF type id at load time.
It is strictly checked to be valid for raw_tp programs only.
In a later patches it will become:
btf_id == 0 semantics of existing raw_tp progs.
btd_id > 0 raw_tp with BTF and additional type safety.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-5-ast@kernel.org
[upstream commit 5cad527d5ffa9a1c4731bb9c97d2ee93f8960d50]
In the commit c504e5c2f964 ("net: skb: introduce kfree_skb_reason()")
drop reason is introduced to the tracepoint of kfree_skb. Therefore,
drop_monitor is able to report the drop reason to users by netlink.
The drop reasons are reported as string to users, which is exactly
the same as what we do when reporting it to ftrace.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209060838.55513-1-imagedong@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[upstream commit a3ce2b109a59ee9670706ae8126dcc04cfe261cd]
When udp_memory_allocated is at the limit, __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb
will return a -ENOBUFS, and skb will be dropped in __udp_queue_rcv_skb
without any counters being done. It's hard to find out what happened
once this happen.
So we introduce a UDP_MIB_MEMERRORS to do this job. Well, this change
looks friendly to the existing users, such as netstat:
$ netstat -u -s
Udp:
0 packets received
639 packets to unknown port received.
158689 packet receive errors
180022 packets sent
RcvbufErrors: 20930
MemErrors: 137759
UdpLite:
IpExt:
InOctets: 257426235
OutOctets: 257460598
InNoECTPkts: 181177
v2:
- Fix some alignment problems
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dong.menglong@zte.com.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604627354-43207-1-git-send-email-dong.menglong@zte.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
Add new cgroup based eBPF hook 'BPF_CGROUP_UDP_UNHASH' which is called
when UDP sock unhashed. This is used to monitor the release of UDP
sock.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
Use the return value of BPF_SOCK_OPS_TCP_CONNECT_CB and
BPF_SOCK_OPS_TCP_LISTEN_CB to determine if the connect() and listen()
should continue.
This is used by eBPF program to check the address and port, and
see if listen() or connect() is allowed.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
For now, 'BPF_SOCK_OPS_STATE_CB' of sock_ops can be used to monitor
the state change of TCP sock. However, once tcp sock change to timewait
sock, 'TCP_CLOSE' event will be passed to the eBPF program, and it's
hard to capture the finish of a TCP connect.
Add 'BPF_CGROUP_TWSK_CLOSE', which will be called when timewait sock
close.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
Add new cgroup based eBPF type 'BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_AUTOBIND', which
is called after the success of port binding in inet_autobind().
The return value is used to determine if this port is usable, therefore
users have the chance to reject the autobind operation.
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
For a simple read-only file system, as long as the connection
is not broken, the recovery of the user-mode read-only file
system process can be realized by putting the request of the
processing list back into the pending list.
Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <flyingpeng@tencent.com>
[ Upstream commit d09845e98a05850a8094ea8fd6dd09a8e6824fff ]
Some kernel-internal ASYNC flags have been superseded by tty-port flags
and should no longer be used by kernel drivers.
Fix the misspelled "__KERNEL__" compile guards which failed their sole
purpose to break out-of-tree drivers that have not yet been updated.
Fixes: 5c0517fefc92 ("tty: core: Undefine ASYNC_* flags superceded by TTY_PORT* flags")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210407095208.31838-2-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6a154ec9ef6762c774cd2b50215c7a8f0f08a862 ]
According with USB Device Class Definition for Video Device the
Processing Unit Descriptor bLength should be 12 (10 + bmControlSize),
but it has 11.
Invalid length caused that Processing Unit Descriptor Test Video form
CV tool failed. To fix this issue patch adds bmVideoStandards into
uvc_processing_unit_descriptor structure.
The bmVideoStandards field was added in UVC 1.1 and it wasn't part of
UVC 1.0a.
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak <pawell@cadence.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315071748.29706-1-pawell@gli-login.cadence.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit c33cb0020ee6dd96cc9976d6085a7d8422f6dbed upstream.
Apparently, <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.h> and
<linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.h> could not be included into the same
compilation unit because of a cut-and-paste typo in the former header.
Fixes: 12f7a505331e6 ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.6
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b59e286be280fa3c2e94a0716ddcee6ba02bc8ba upstream.
Based on RFC7112, Section 6:
IANA has added the following "Type 4 - Parameter Problem" message to
the "Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) Parameters"
registry:
CODE NAME/DESCRIPTION
3 IPv6 First Fragment has incomplete IPv6 Header Chain
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Aviraj CJ <acj@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7d6e1329652ed971d1b6e0e7bea66fba5044e271 ]
The following functional changes were needed for backport:
- vfio_iommu_type1_get_info doesn't exist, call
vfio_iommu_dma_avail_build_caps from vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl.
- As further fallout from this, vfio_iommu_dma_avail_build_caps must
acquire and release the iommu mutex lock. To do so, the return value is
stored in a local variable as in vfio_iommu_iova_build_caps.
Upstream commit description:
Commit 492855939bdb ("vfio/type1: Limit DMA mappings per container")
added the ability to limit the number of memory backed DMA mappings.
However on s390x, when lazy mapping is in use, we use a very large
number of concurrent mappings. Let's provide the current allowable
number of DMA mappings to userspace via the IOMMU info chain so that
userspace can take appropriate mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
in eks network, some ports is reserved for default ns snat/dnat.
we'd like a way to forbid binding these ports in non-default ns.
this api is for testing whether a packet belongs to default netns.
test case: test bind relevant ports from both netns
Switch BPF UAPI constants, previously defined as #define macro, to anonymous
enum values. This preserves constants values and behavior in expressions, but
has added advantaged of being captured as part of DWARF and, subsequently, BTF
type info. Which, in turn, greatly improves usefulness of generated vmlinux.h
for BPF applications, as it will not require BPF users to copy/paste various
flags and constants, which are frequently used with BPF helpers. Only those
constants that are used/useful from BPF program side are converted.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200303003233.3496043-2-andriin@fb.com
Add ability to memory-map contents of BPF array map. This is extremely useful
for working with BPF global data from userspace programs. It allows to avoid
typical bpf_map_{lookup,update}_elem operations, improving both performance
and usability.
There had to be special considerations for map freezing, to avoid having
writable memory view into a frozen map. To solve this issue, map freezing and
mmap-ing is happening under mutex now:
- if map is already frozen, no writable mapping is allowed;
- if map has writable memory mappings active (accounted in map->writecnt),
map freezing will keep failing with -EBUSY;
- once number of writable memory mappings drops to zero, map freezing can be
performed again.
Only non-per-CPU plain arrays are supported right now. Maps with spinlocks
can't be memory mapped either.
For BPF_F_MMAPABLE array, memory allocation has to be done through vmalloc()
to be mmap()'able. We also need to make sure that array data memory is
page-sized and page-aligned, so we over-allocate memory in such a way that
struct bpf_array is at the end of a single page of memory with array->value
being aligned with the start of the second page. On deallocation we need to
accomodate this memory arrangement to free vmalloc()'ed memory correctly.
One important consideration regarding how memory-mapping subsystem functions.
Memory-mapping subsystem provides few optional callbacks, among them open()
and close(). close() is called for each memory region that is unmapped, so
that users can decrease their reference counters and free up resources, if
necessary. open() is *almost* symmetrical: it's called for each memory region
that is being mapped, **except** the very first one. So bpf_map_mmap does
initial refcnt bump, while open() will do any extra ones after that. Thus
number of close() calls is equal to number of open() calls plus one more.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191117172806.2195367-4-andriin@fb.com
commit a85cbe6159ffc973e5702f70a3bd5185f8f3c38d upstream.
and include <linux/const.h> in UAPI headers instead of <linux/kernel.h>.
The reason is to avoid indirect <linux/sysinfo.h> include when using
some network headers: <linux/netlink.h> or others -> <linux/kernel.h>
-> <linux/sysinfo.h>.
This indirect include causes on MUSL redefinition of struct sysinfo when
included both <sys/sysinfo.h> and some of UAPI headers:
In file included from x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/kernel.h:5,
from x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/netlink.h:5,
from ../include/tst_netlink.h:14,
from tst_crypto.c:13:
x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/sysinfo.h:8:8: error: redefinition of `struct sysinfo'
struct sysinfo {
^~~~~~~
In file included from ../include/tst_safe_macros.h:15,
from ../include/tst_test.h:93,
from tst_crypto.c:11:
x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/sys/sysinfo.h:10:8: note: originally defined here
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201015190013.8901-1-petr.vorel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Acked-by: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Cc: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ceb6543e9cf6ed87cc1fbc6f23ca2db903564cd upstream.
There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are
only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in
the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel
developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags.
In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com
there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a
user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if
__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition
available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem.
So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly
in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to
fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only
present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and
comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync.
Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for
longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source
compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in
an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build.
However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags
with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it
clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it.
Fixes: 2336d0deb2d4 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f966cba95c78029f491b433ea95ff38f414a761 upstream.
Add a per-transaction flag to indicate that the buffer
must be cleared when the transaction is complete to
prevent copies of sensitive data from being preserved
in memory.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120233743.3617529-1-tkjos@google.com
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 92eb6c3060ebe3adf381fd9899451c5b047bb14d upstream.
Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
in sockaddr_alg. However, the actual length of the salg_name field
stayed at the original 64 bytes.
This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be
defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
(either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an
easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
This addresses the syzbot report
"UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=92ead4eb8e26a26d465e).
Reported-by: syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0032ce0f85a269a006e91277be5fdbc05fad8426 upstream.
ptrace_get_syscall_info() is potentially copying uninitialized stack
memory to userspace, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole near the
beginning of `info`. Fix it by adding a padding field to `struct
ptrace_syscall_info`.
Fixes: 201766a20e30 ("ptrace: add PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request")
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200801152044.230416-1-yepeilin.cs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1b9ae0c92925ac40489be526d67d0010d0724ce0 upstream.
When compiling inside the kernel include linux/stddef.h instead of
stddef.h. When I compile this header file in backports for power PC I
run into a conflict with ptrdiff_t. I was unable to reproduce this in
mainline kernel. I still would like to fix this problem in the kernel.
Fixes: 6989310f5d43 ("wireless: Use offsetof instead of custom macro.")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200521201422.16493-1-hauke@hauke-m.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8c39076c276be0b31982e44654e2c2357473258a upstream.
RFC 7862 introduced a new flag that either client or server is
allowed to set: EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_FENCE_OPS.
Client needs to update its bitmask to allow for this flag value.
v2: changed minor version argument to unsigned int
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1465af12e254a68706e110846f59cf0f09683184 upstream.
Commit 259ee7754b67 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add ROOT_ITEM check")
introduced btrfs root item size check, however btrfs root item has two
versions, the legacy one which just ends before generation_v2 member, is
smaller than current btrfs root item size.
This caused btrfs kernel to reject valid but old tree root leaves.
Fix this problem by also allowing legacy root item, since kernel can
already handle them pretty well and upgrade to newer root item format
when needed.
Reported-by: Martin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de>
Fixes: 259ee7754b67 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add ROOT_ITEM check")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Tested-By: Martin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b305dfe2e93434b12d438434461b709641f62af4 ]
The default RGB quantization range for BT.2020 is full range (just as for
all the other RGB pixel encodings), not limited range.
Update the V4L2_MAP_QUANTIZATION_DEFAULT macro and documentation
accordingly.
Also mention that HSV is always full range and cannot be limited range.
When RGB BT2020 was introduced in V4L2 it was not clear whether it should
be limited or full range, but full range is the right (and consistent)
choice.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1aef5b4391f0c75c0a1523706a7b0311846ee12f upstream.
This should be "current" not "skb".
Fixes: c6b5fb8690fa ("bpf: add documentation for eBPF helpers (42-50)")
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200910203314.70018-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f3d301c1f2f5676465cdf3259737ea19cc82731f ]
perf_event.h has macros that define the field offsets in the
data_src bitmask in perf records. The SNOOPX and REMOTE offsets
were both 37. These are distinct fields, and the bitfield layout
in perf_mem_data_src confirms that SNOOPX should be at offset 38.
Fixes: 52839e653b5629bd ("perf tools: Add support for printing new mem_info encodings")
Signed-off-by: Al Grant <al.grant@foss.arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4ac9f5cc-4388-b34a-9999-418a4099415d@foss.arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 15e9e35cd1dec2bc138464de6bf8ef828df19235 ]
MIPS defines two kvm types:
#define KVM_VM_MIPS_TE 0
#define KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ 1
In Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst it is said that "You probably want to
use 0 as machine type", which implies that type 0 be the "automatic" or
"default" type. And, in user-space libvirt use the null-machine (with
type 0) to detect the kvm capability, which returns "KVM not supported"
on a VZ platform.
I try to fix it in QEMU but it is ugly:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-08/msg05629.html
And Thomas Huth suggests me to change the definition of kvm type:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-09/msg03281.html
So I define like this:
#define KVM_VM_MIPS_AUTO 0
#define KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ 1
#define KVM_VM_MIPS_TE 2
Since VZ and TE cannot co-exists, using type 0 on a TE platform will
still return success (so old user-space tools have no problems on new
kernels); the advantage is that using type 0 on a VZ platform will not
return failure. So, the only problem is "new user-space tools use type
2 on old kernels", but if we treat this as a kernel bug, we can backport
this patch to old stable kernels.
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Message-Id: <1599734031-28746-1-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit da9125df854ea48a6240c66e8a67be06e2c12c03 ]
This should be NFTA_LIST_UNSPEC instead of NFTA_LIST_UNPEC, all other
similar attribute definitions are postfixed with _UNSPEC.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 47e33c05f9f07cac3de833e531bcac9ae052c7ca ]
When SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID was first introduced it had the wrong
direction flag set. While this isn't a big deal as nothing currently
enforces these bits in the kernel, it should be defined correctly. Fix
the define and provide support for the old command until it is no longer
needed for backward compatibility.
Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6989310f5d4327e8595664954edd40a7f99ddd0d upstream.
Use offsetof to calculate offset of a field to take advantage of
compiler built-in version when possible, and avoid UBSAN warning when
compiling with Clang:
==================================================================
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/wireless/wext-core.c:525:14
member access within null pointer of type 'struct iw_point'
CPU: 3 PID: 165 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: G S W 4.19.23 #43
Workqueue: cfg80211 __cfg80211_scan_done [cfg80211]
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x194
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
__dump_stack+0x20/0x28
dump_stack+0x70/0x94
ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x44
ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0xf4/0xfc
__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1+0x34/0x54
wireless_send_event+0x3cc/0x470
___cfg80211_scan_done+0x13c/0x220 [cfg80211]
__cfg80211_scan_done+0x28/0x34 [cfg80211]
process_one_work+0x170/0x35c
worker_thread+0x254/0x380
kthread+0x13c/0x158
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
===================================================================
Signed-off-by: Pi-Hsun Shih <pihsun@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204081307.138765-1-pihsun@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c463bb2a8f8d7d97aa414bf7714fc77e9d3b10df ]
This event code represents the state of a removable cover of a device.
Value 0 means that the cover is open or removed, value 1 means that the
cover is closed.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@wizzup.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200612125402.18393-2-merlijn@wizzup.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f794db6841e5480208f0c3a3ac1df445a96b079e upstream.
Until this commit the mainline kernel version (this version) of the
vboxguest module contained a bug where it defined
VBGL_IOCTL_VMMDEV_REQUEST_BIG and VBGL_IOCTL_LOG using
_IOC(_IOC_READ | _IOC_WRITE, 'V', ...) instead of
_IO(V, ...) as the out of tree VirtualBox upstream version does.
Since the VirtualBox userspace bits are always built against VirtualBox
upstream's headers, this means that so far the mainline kernel version
of the vboxguest module has been failing these 2 ioctls with -ENOTTY.
I guess that VBGL_IOCTL_VMMDEV_REQUEST_BIG is never used causing us to
not hit that one and sofar the vboxguest driver has failed to actually
log any log messages passed it through VBGL_IOCTL_LOG.
This commit changes the VBGL_IOCTL_VMMDEV_REQUEST_BIG and VBGL_IOCTL_LOG
defines to match the out of tree VirtualBox upstream vboxguest version,
while keeping compatibility with the old wrong request defines so as
to not break the kernel ABI in case someone has been using the old
request defines.
Fixes: f6ddd094f579 ("virt: Add vboxguest driver for Virtual Box Guest integration UAPI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200709120858.63928-2-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3234ac664a870e6ea69ae3a57d824cd7edbeacc5 ]
Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.
Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.
Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.
Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.
The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of
truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the
implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it
is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it
relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of
absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are
invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to
continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they
will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can
block those subsequent accesses.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f7d31e65368aeef973fab788aa22c4f1d5a6af66 ]
The problem the patch is trying to address is the fact that 'struct
kvm_hyperv_exit' has different layout on when compiling in 32 and 64 bit
modes.
In 64-bit mode the default alignment boundary is 64 bits thus
forcing extra gaps after 'type' and 'msr' but in 32-bit mode the
boundary is at 32 bits thus no extra gaps.
This is an issue as even when the kernel is 64 bit, the userspace using
the interface can be both 32 and 64 bit but the same 32 bit userspace has
to work with 32 bit kernel.
The issue is fixed by forcing the 64 bit layout, this leads to ABI
change for 32 bit builds and while we are obviously breaking '32 bit
userspace with 32 bit kernel' case, we're fixing the '32 bit userspace
with 64 bit kernel' one.
As the interface has no (known) users and 32 bit KVM is rather baroque
nowadays, this seems like a reasonable decision.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Doron <arilou@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200424113746.3473563-2-arilou@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rvkagan@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 83fc5dd57f86c3ec7d6d22565a6ff6c948853b64 upstream.
The definitions of MMC_IOC_CMD and of MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD rely on
MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR:
#define MMC_IOC_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 0, struct mmc_ioc_cmd)
#define MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 1, struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd)
However, MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR is defined in linux/major.h and
linux/mmc/ioctl.h did not include it.
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200511161902.191405-1-Jerome.Pouiller@silabs.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Alexei Starovoitov