forked from TencentOS/TencentOS-kernel
x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR at boot
Upstream commit id: 1db2a6e1e29ff994443a9eef7cf3d26104c777a7 Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL to enable VMX when the MSR is left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring feature control at boot time paves the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g. Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection. Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the kernel and enabled via feature control, but the kernel currently uses LMCE if and only if the feature is explicitly enabled by BIOS. Keep the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can opt in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so. Always lock IA32_FEAT_CTL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't support VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries the MSR can assume it's locked. Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to IA32_FEAT_CTL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so as not to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ config X86_DEBUGCTLMSR
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def_bool y
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depends on !(MK6 || MWINCHIPC6 || MWINCHIP3D || MCYRIXIII || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486) && !UML
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config IA32_FEAT_CTL
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def_bool y
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depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
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menuconfig PROCESSOR_SELECT
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bool "Supported processor vendors" if EXPERT
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---help---
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@ -567,6 +567,13 @@
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#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
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#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS 0x00000d90
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/* Referred to as IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL in Intel's SDM. */
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#define MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL 0x0000003a
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#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)
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#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)
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#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2)
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#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)
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#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD 0x00000ffc
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#define MSR_IA32_XSS 0x00000da0
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@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ obj-y += umwait.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_FEAT_CTL) += feat_ctl.o
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ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
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obj-y += intel.o intel_pconfig.o tsx.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_PM) += intel_epb.o
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@ -81,4 +81,8 @@ extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
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extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
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#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_FEAT_CTL
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void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
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#endif
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#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/tboot.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#include <asm/msr-index.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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{
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u64 msr;
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if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr))
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return;
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if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
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return;
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/*
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* Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random
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* features or faulting on the WRMSR.
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*/
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msr = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
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/*
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* Enable VMX if and only if the kernel may do VMXON at some point,
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* i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
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* for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
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*/
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if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
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msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
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if (tboot_enabled())
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msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
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}
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
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}
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